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Talking Points for DCI on Reykjavik Goals

Beyond INF and setting a summit date, the big issues at Reykjavik are:

- * On arms control: Space arms and their connection to START deductions
- * On regional issues: Afghanistan

The $\underline{\text{minimum}}$ goal of the President should be to assert and defend his positions on these key issues.

- * His framework on space as presented in his 25 July letter, (superseding or "novating" the ABM Treaty) versus Gorbachev's framework ("strengthening" the ABM Treaty).
- * On Afghanistan, the need for the USSR to withdraw <u>and give upon</u> imposing a Communist regime there (and elsewhere). The <u>maximum</u> reasonable goal the President could strive for is to get Gorbachev to agree to talk seriously and negotiate about:
 - * The President's space framework
 - * The possibility of a non-Communist regime in Afghanistan.

Even if Gorbachev gave no more than a promise to talk seriously about these points—which he has studiously avoided—the President would get a big boost of SDI and the Soviet position in Afghanistan would be weakened. Yet both things are reasonable to ask for and, if refusal caused the meeting to fail, the President would have the high ground, not Gorbachev.